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THE PRICE OF PATRIOTISM 
ALBERTA CATTLEMEN AND THE LOSS OF THE AMERICAN 
MARKET, 194 2~48 
MAX FORAN 
One of the most controversial episodes in 
the history of the western Canadian cattle in-
dustry occurred during the years 1942-48 when 
the Canadian government imposed an em-
bargo on Canadian cattle entering the United 
States. This unprecedented measure was a re-
action to the extraordinary demands of the 
national war effort, and was accepted condi-
tionally by the cattle industry as a necessary 
patriotic gesture. However, official wartime 
policies respecting this embargo, and its re-
tention beyond the war until late 1948 were 
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neither anticipated nor appreciated by west-
ern Canadian stockmen. Their efforts to re-
store a market deemed crucial to their 
industry's survival, and the government's 
seeming failure to appreciate the stockmen's 
position, clearly showed that the "price of pa-
triotism" went beyond merely fighting a war. 
Since its inception in the early 1880s, the 
western Canadian cattle industry depended 
on export markets. Although home consump-
tion accounted for about ninety percent of 
Canadian cattle marketings, it was the export-
able ten percent that determined domestic 
prices and defined the quality standard for 
Canadian beef.! Over the years only two mar-
kets absorbed this annual surplus of between 
15Q,000 and 200,000 head. The first was in 
Great Britain where demand for Canadian 
cattle helped nurture the western Canadian 
ranching industry up to 1907. This market 
was eclipsed after 1914 when relaxation of the 
American tariff encouraged the southward 
movement of Canadian cattle. This new 
American outlet for both fat stock and feeder 
cattle was so profitable that by 1920 it had 
become axiomatic among Canadian cattlemen 
that their industry's survival depended upon 
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its availability.2 As such, much of the Cana-
dian stockmen's economic travail between 
1921 and 1935 was blamed on the renewed 
American tariffs of 1921-22 and 1930, that 
imposed daunting levies of between two and 
three cents per pound and which, especially 
during the years 1921-25 and 1930-34, made 
it virtually impossible to ship cattle profitably 
to United States points. 3 
Despite its popularity among western Ca-
nadian cattlemen, the American market did 
not figure highly in the emerging Canadian 
agricultural policies of the period. It was per-
ceived as unstable and subject to tariff volatil-
ity. More important, however, was the 
Canadian federal government's commitment 
to the British market as the most dependable 
and permanent outlet for its agricultural prod-
ucts. Especially after the Imperial Conference 
of 1932, when Britain formally abandoned her 
century-old commitment to free trade in fa-
vor of a system of imperial preference, Cana-
dian policymakers became convinced that they 
had at last secured a market to absorb the 
nation's growing agricultural surpluses. That 
these agricultural policies were built around 
the British need for wheat and pork, and not 
cattle, mattered little in the new scheme of 
things. Cattle exports emerged as an add-on 
entity, one not really needed nor even wanted 
by Great Britain and certainly not a factor to 
the Canadian beef producer who realized that 
the British market was simply not viable in 
normal circumstances, and was but a pale re-
placement for the country's natural market in 
the United States. 
There can be little doubt that the Ameri-
can market for Canadian cattle was volatile. 
For instance, there were no fewer than nine 
US tariff revisions between 1881 and 1940. 
One has only to note the strenuous efforts by 
Canadian producers to pressure the United 
States to remove the 1920s tariff, or the re-
cent action taken by an American group of 
producers (R-CALF) in 1999 to bring anti-
dumping and countervailing duty cases against 
Canada, to realize the ever-present tensions 
between the industries in the two countries.4 
In 1935 the Americans responded to 
Britain's policy of imperial preference through 
tariff revisions that allowed reciprocal agree-
ments covering certain products. Under two 
trade agreements reached in 1935 and 1939, 
Canada was allowed to ship a certain number 
of cattle to the United States at reduced rates 
of duty.s In 1935 the levy on an assigned quota 
of Canadian cattle over 700 pounds was re-
duced by one-third to two cents per pound 
and later in 1939 to one and one-half cents 
per pound. In addition, Canada was given 86.5 
percent of the American annual import quota 
of 225,000 head, with no more than 51,750 
head to be shipped in anyone quarter. Surplus 
cattle shipped over and above the quarterly 
quota were subject to the regular duty rates. 
The impact of these trade relations was both 
immediate and dramatic. In 1934 Canada ex-
ported only 6,341 head to the United States. 
In 1935 the number had jumped to 102,934 
and two years later reached 208,552.6 In 1939, 
the winter quarterly quota was filled in one 
month. 7 By 1940, in the wake of rising prices 
and consumer demand, over 229,000 head 
made their way south.s With a natural equi-
librium partially restored, Canadian stockmen 
entered the war period on a positive note, 
confident that the renewed American market 
would enable them to recoup some of the losses 
incurred during the early 1920s and 1930&. 
Through 1940-41 and into 1942, this quota-
regulated market remained open. American 
lend-lease commitments and her armament 
priorities meant a steady demand and rising 
prices for Canadian cattle. Even though home 
demand for beef escalated in response to 
Canada's commitment of huge amounts of 
bacon under the "Bacon to Britain" program, 
Canadian cattlemen genuinely believed that 
they could contribute to the war effort by 
satsifying both the home and export market.9 
The official voice of western Canadian cattle 
interests, the Western Stock Growers Asso-
ciation (WSGA), reflected the stockmen's 
commitment to increased production by pass-
ing a resolution in 1940 assuring the govern-
ment of "our earnest desire to assist and 
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co-operate by every means in our power to 
prosecute to a successful conclusion of the 
waLlO 
In the spring of 1942, with a dramatic sud-
denness, the cry of meat shortage was raised in 
eastern Canada. ll Headlines in the eastern 
Canadian press condemned cattle producers 
for creating this shortage by holding back sup-
plies in favor of the more lucrative American 
market. 12 It was also suggested that in order to 
protect Canadian supplies, all cattle exports 
to the United States should be stopped. 13 
There seems to be little justification for 
this criticism of the cattle producers. lhe 
Department of Agriculture was sufficiently 
upset over the matter to issue a public state-
ment on 17 April that referred to increased 
production, and which stated in part that 
"strong exception is taken ... to widely pub-
licized implications that farmers have created 
a shortage of beef by withholding cattle from 
the market in order to obtain higher prices in 
the United States."14 The department had a 
point, for while shipments to the United States 
had increased by 59,442 in the January-May 
1942 period in comparison with the same pe-
riod in 1941, the number of head sold to Ca-
nadian stockyards and packing plants in the 
same period was up by 47,222.15 At the time 
the shortage cry was raised the American ex-
port quota had not been filled. 16 
It was likely other factors unrelated to live 
cattle marketings were more responsible for 
the proclaimed shortage. Frozen beef supplies 
had been reduced through a substantial and 
largely unexplained increase in the amount of 
dressed meat shipped to the United States in 
the first three monrhs of 1942 over 1941 lev-
els.1) Second, short-term pressure had been 
placed on beef supplies by the increased re-
striction on pork consumption. Another fac-
tor concerned the packing industry and its 
response to the recently enacted government 
controls. In the fall of 1941, ceiling prices were 
placed on all goods by the newly constituted 
Wartime Prices and Trade Board. The ceiling 
was to be the highest price obtained during a 
base period of 15 September to 11 October 
1941.18 When a new board ruling in March 
1942 compelled the packers to sell to their 
individual customers at the same price as they 
had sold to that customer during the base pe-
riod, many refused to sell, especially to the big 
retailers who had purchased at a low ceiling 
price. 19 
The cattle producers' role in creating the 
shortage (and it was never really ascertained 
that there was a shortage) was related to the 
fact that the new ceilings, which did not allow 
for any seasonal adjustment. This meant that 
the more expensive grain-fed cattle came to 
market under the same domestic price ceiling 
as grass-fed range beef, a situation exacerbated 
by the fact that the ceilings were not on live 
cattle but on dressed beef (or the product sold 
to retailers by the packers). One predicable 
reaction for feeders facing heavy losses was to 
take advantage of the higher US prices and 
export as many grain-finished animals as pos-
sible within the allowed quota. 20 
The WSGA first heard rumor of a proposed 
embargo on 31 March 1942. At a special meet-
ing called the same date, a dispatch was sent 
to Ottawa requesting for clarification. In the 
ensuing discussion, it became clear that the 
WSGA's preference Was for an adjustable ceil-
ing that would reward the feeder and also 
maintain the export trade. 21 Less than a month 
later, producers across western Canada were 
invited to Winnipeg by F. S. Grisdale, deputy 
food administrator under the Wartime Prices 
and Trade Board, to discuss the situation. At 
this meeting the producers rejected a sugges-
tion by Grisdale that the government buy all 
surplus beef and divert it to export as neces-
sary.22 Despite these sentiments, an order in 
council was passed on 20 May conferring on 
the Wartime Prices and Trade Board the power 
to control the export of cattle whenever short-
ages in the domestic supply occurred. 23 Then 
on 29 May the board announced a new com-
prehensive plan of action. The Wartime Food 
Corporation was to be formed to regulate the 
export trade through the issuance of export 
licences covering individual shipments and to 
divert cattle from export as deemed necessary 
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to maintain satisfactory price levels. Diverted 
export shipments would receive the prevail-
ing US price and would be resold to packers at 
a loss to maintain prices below the ceiling. 24 
This new corporation was to begin operations 
on 1 July 1942. 
The WSGA announced its official response 
during its annual convention inJune. The right 
to the U.S. export market was couched as an 
obligation given her enormous commitments 
under the lend-lease agreements. 21 In express-
ing a desire to work closely with government 
and to increase production to meet expand-
ing demands, WSGA President George L. 
Stringham left no doubt as to where the asso-
ciation stood on the export question: "Let no 
one delude themselves; should our export 
market to the States be lost ... Mexico will 
gain it and at the conclusion of the war it 
would be most difficult and probably impos-
sible for us again to enter it on the same 
favourable basis."26 Clearly, the sentiments 
were meant to caution the Food Corporation 
not to abandon the export trade in exercising 
its mandate. The warning however fell on deaf 
ears. 
Within a week of its inception the Food 
Corporation was condemned by the WSGA 
as hopelessly inefficient. Calls for disband-
ment met with flat refusals from Donald Gor-
don, chairman of the Wartime Prices and 
Trade BoardY Time would eventually vindi-
cate the WSGA's position. The diversion of 
exports up to the quarterly quota of 51,000 
proved to be chaotically mismanaged. The 
WSGA argued that the US price for diverted 
export cattle was compromised by the Food 
Corporation's practice of moving carloads of 
animals from point to point to obtain lower 
appraisals. 28 Some stockmen violated the in-
tent of the new policy by declaring substan-
dard animals fit for export. 29 Then in the 
middle of August, when the Food Corpora-
tion announced that the export quota had 
been filled and that the Canadian ceiling 
would replace the higher export price, many 
producers simply withdrew their animals from 
the market in anticipation of the new quar-
terly quota commencing in October when the 
US export price would again be paid.30 
Faced with this chaotic situation, and in 
light of Gordon's refusal to abolish the Food 
Corporation or at least amend its mandate, 
the WSGA called a special meeting on 25 
August.3! After an all-day discussion a com-
mittee of five was struck to frame resolutions 
to be forwarded to the federal government. 
Two motions were brought forward. The mo-
tion to have the Food Corporation pay the 
export price for all the cattle it needed and to 
sell the rest in the open market was defeated. 
The second resolution calling for the Food 
Corporation to export surplus cattle to main-
tain a ceiling flexible enough to reflect real 
production costs was passed unanimously. The 
defeat of the first motion and the unanimous 
acceptance of the second was a clear indica-
tion that the WSGA was prepared to give up 
the export price but not the export market. 
In later debates with the government, the 
WSGA would always argue that the intent of 
this unanimous motion clearly indicated its 
willingness to temporarily abrogate its mem-
bers' hard-earned right to export and further-
more to accept the much lower Canadian 
ceiling price for their cattleY Moreover, the 
motion's preamble stated that the Wartime 
Prices and Trade Board did intend to main-
tain the export market (or so the WSGA be-
lieved). The defeat of the first motion, together 
with the tenor of the discussions at the vari-
ous directors' and general meetings, reaffirmed 
the WSGA's priorities. The stockmen genu-
inely believed that some sacrifice was neces-
sary on their part in order to maintain 
satisfactory domestic beef supplies and prices. 
They felt that price ceilings in line with pro-
duction costs afforded them adequate protec-
tion. Most importantly, they were of the 
opinion that the export market to the United 
States was not going to be abandoned and 
would continue to be utilized by the Food 
Corporation when increased supply put down-
ward pressure on prices. 
It could also be argued that the stockmen 
were worried by the alarming trend in the black 
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market trade, a practice already viewed as 
threatening the industry's stability by jeopar-
dizing price controls and driving the price of 
beef upward to a point where consumers could 
not or would not buy.33 One report estimated 
that at least 20 percent of beef slaughtered in 
the United States went to black marketeers. 
In January 1943 the Montreal Star quoted rep-
resentatives of two packing houses who main-
tained that most Montrealers were eating black 
market beef. During a debate on the subject in 
the House of Commons, one M.P. quoted fig-
ures that showed that the number of inspected 
killings in eastern Canada actually fell in 1942 
in spite of the large increase in western Cana-
dian shipments to eastern points.34 
Almost immediately following the WSGA 
meeting of 25 August, the Food Corporation 
announced "a complete change in the govern-
mental policy of handling the beef cattle in-
dustry." All cattle exports to the United States 
were terminated except by the Food Corpora-
tion. Conditions under which it would now 
operate mirrored closely the WSGA resolu-
tion of 25 August.35 The WSGA responded in 
a press release affirming the new policy and 
terming it "the only action to have taken un-
der the circumstances."36 The WSGA could 
be excused for believing that the new govern-
ment policy, both in its intent and timing, 
was a tacit acceptance of the position the as-
sociation had adopted at its 25 August meet-
ing. 
The Food Corporation, however, did not 
honor the intent of the new policy. Instead of 
exporting surplus cattle, it retained them in 
cold storage pending future needs. From a 
promise to buy and export any surplus, the 
policy changed to one of buying when a sur-
plus developed, processing and storing it, and 
exporting only in the unlikely event of this 
reserve being depleted. By the time the Food 
Corporation was phased out in early 1943, not 
a single head had been exported. Further-
more, the producers continued to expand pro-
duction, acceding to the government's request 
that cattle be kept longer to increase overall 
tonnage.37 
In March 1943 in a possible response to 
ongoing differences between the Wartime 
Prices and Trade Board and the Department 
of Agriculture over food administration poli-
cies, the federal government reshuffled its food 
marketing organization. Responsibility for the 
marketing of cattle passed to the Department 
of Agriculture through the newly constituted 
Meat Board (formerly the Bacon Board), which 
promised to buy dressed beef at scheduled vari-
able floor prices. The substitution of the Food 
Corporation by a more autonomous Meat 
Board had significant implications. Instead of 
buying beef under the ceilings in competition 
with the packers, the Meat Board could now 
purchase beed unilaterally at the new floor 
prices. The cost of subsidizing consumers to 
keep prices down had in effect shifted from 
the government to the producer. And as if to 
add insult to injury, from the stockmen's view-
point, the responsibility for the export of live 
cattle, i.e., the US market, continued to de-
volve on the Wartime Prices and Trade Board 
and not the Department of Agriculture. Later 
the latter was to use this jurisdictional differ-
ence to parry the stockmen seeking a renewal 
of the US live cattle export market. 
In June 1943 the Meat Board clearly 
showed the official priority respecting 
Canada's beef export market when Chairman 
J. G. McTaggart announced that "we will in 
effect be providing a beef market in the United 
Kingdom as a substitute for the live beef cattle 
market in the U.S. which has been re-
stricted."38 While the policy of diverting sur-
plus beef to war-torn Britain could not be 
faulted on patriotic grounds, it was also con-
sistent with prewar Canadian agricultural 
policy that saw Britain as the ideal terminus 
for Canadian beef exports, a preference with 
which the stockmen had always taken strong 
exception.39 
Western Canadian stockmen correctly be-
lieved that the British market for their cattle 
functioned as a safety valve in times when its 
American counterpart was curtailed.40 They 
indicated to the high ocean freight rates and 
the furious competition from Argentina and 
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the Irish Free State as putting their marketings 
at a crippling disadvantage. Significant move-
ments of Canadian cattle to Great Britain af-
ter 1906 occurred only in the early 1920s and 
1930s and were forced solely by the inhibiting 
US tariffs on Canadian exports. When US 
prices were favorable the British market was 
of little or no consequence.41 
The official policy had always been differ-
ent, doubtless inspired by imperial sentiment 
and a residual mistrust of American tariff 
policy. Federal experiments to develop a 
chilled beef trade with Britain in the 1920s 
and its series of baby beef shipments in the 
1930s, though both unsuccessful, clearly 
showed that the British market considered 
this a viable and more desirable outlet than 
the volatile American-governed alternative.42 
Dominion Livestock Commissioner H. S. 
Arkell stated the government case in 1939. In 
referring to the fierceness of international 
competition, and warning about the fickle-
ness of the US market, Arkell indirectly cas-
tigated the beef producers, and reiterated the 
official position that Canada's best place was 
under the imperial wing: '~The Empire pre-
ference which we enjoy in the sale of food 
products to the United Kingdom together 
with the stabilization of price under British 
policy which safeguards the position of Ca-
nadians ... constitutes a trading advantage 
which is or should be worth more to Cana-
dians than I think she really yet under-
stands."43 Federal Agriculture Minister James 
Gardiner, an avowed proponent of the Brit-
ish market, was even more explicit when he 
told the House of Commons on 3 March 1944 
that "Canada has a double opportunity in 
supplying surplus beef to the United King-
dom at present to meet urgent needs and to 
build a market there for the post war 
years." 44 Gardiner had been a vital agent in 
shaping Canadia's agricultural policy since the 
mid-1930s, and World War II only intensi-
fied his commitment toward maintaining the 
British market in postwar years. The highly 
contentious wheat agreement, which tar-
nished his reputation as a skilled bargainer, 
was one unhappy legacy of this commitment 
to empire.45 
Despite its implications, the replacement 
of the American market by the British was not 
pivotal in inspiring the resentment that threw 
the export issue once more into the forefront 
by the spring of 1944. Rather it was the prob-
lem of falling live cattle prices. Feedlot beef 
tonnage was up in response to the govern-
ment plea for increased production.46 Yet a 
government coarse grains subsidy had the ef-
fect of raising feeding costs since it was not 
applicable to either commercial or farmer pur-
chases of grain for feeding purposes. Another 
problem was caused by discrepancies between 
live cattle prices on which there was no price 
control and that of the packer-controlled 
dressed beef floors and ceilings. 47 The relaxing 
of restrictions on domestic pork sales in the 
second half of 1943 put further downward pres-
sure on beef prices. Added to the stockmen's 
woes was the negative impact caused by the 
cessation of big construction projects in the 
north and the resulting large-scale troop relo-
cations.48 By early 1944 the value of feeder 
cows was below the corresponding floor price. 49 
In March 1944 a large gathering of cattle 
producers at Lethbridge reaffirmed the right 
to the US market in the light of the Septem-
ber 1942 policy statement by the Wartime 
Prices and Trade Board that it would export 
surplus live cattle to support domestic price 
levels. 50 The Canadian Federation of Agricul-
ture followed up with its own resolution call-
ing for the removal of the American embargo, 
and a month later the WSGA asked the gov-
ernment to "take steps to move surplus cattle 
to the US immediately."51 
It WaS clear, however, that the federal gov-
ernment had no intention of considering the 
US market, arguing first that any attempt to 
reopen it would result in an embargo on Ca-
nadian cattle since, despite higher prices, the 
American producer was actually getting less 
for his cattle than a year previously.52 Sec-
ondly, it was stated that the resumption of 
shipments to the United States would simply 
mean that the latter would have to increase its 
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lend-lease shipments, and that Canada was 
better suited to utilize her own like program 
to ship more cattle to needy areas. 53 
In July 1944 Gardiner announced the 
completion of negotiations to supply the 
United Kingdom with a minimum of 100 mil-
lion pounds of beef during the period 1944-
45, and furthermore to furnish the same market 
with all surpluses as they became available. 54 
Aside from the fact that the US market was 
now completely discounted, this new contract 
had mixed results for cattlemen. On the one 
hand, they were assured the domestic floor 
price since the Canadian Treasury made up 
the difference between what the United King-
dom could afford to pay and the Canadian 
floor price.55 However, this new year-round 
floor, which was revised on the basis of the 
United Kingdom contract, meant there was 
little incentive for feeders to carry their ani-
mals through to a quality finish. 56 
The heavy fall marketings in 1944 showed 
that cattlemen were not fully protected by the 
much-heralded British beef contract. Simply 
put, Canadian processing facilities could not 
handle the volume of livestock being moved 
through them. In the first forty-five weeks of 
1944, cattle marketings alone were up by 
200,000 over the same period a year earlier.57 
The congestion was so great that some central 
markets placed embargoes on cattle from west-
ern shipping points. Those stockmen with 
short feed supplies could not hold their ani-
mals over for sale at a later date. 58 The results 
were diminished sales, a general trend toward 
lower prices, and a futile plea from stockmen 
to add floor and ceiling prices to live cattle as 
well the existing schedules on dressed beef. 
As the war came to a close in the spring of 
1945, the question of reopening the Ameri-
can market gained more currency among stock 
growers. At this early stage, sentiments were 
low key. The Lethbridge Herald called for a 
token number of cattle to be bought at Cana-
dian prices and shipped to the United States 
as a way of reasserting claim to a market "given 
up with great trepidation."59 In responding to 
the renewed commitment to supply beef to 
Britain beyond the war, the editor of the Farm 
and Ranch Review resignedly commented that 
"as long as Britain demands all of Canada's 
exportable meat supply, it will be difficult to 
convince Ottawa that beef cattle should be 
allowed to cross the line."60 InJuly the Alberta 
Federation of Agriculture passed a motion to 
its parent body, the Canadian Federation of 
Agriculture, calling for the resumption of 
cattle exports to the United States.61 
What really spurred the cattlemen into ac-
tion was the realization that the Canadian 
government was serious about maintaining the 
British market after the war and possibly on a 
permanent basis. Experience had taught them 
that Britain was not and never could be a re-
liable outlet for their cattle. A livestock ex-
pert told the Canadian Society of Animal 
Production (Western Section) in June 1945 
that Canada could not compete with cheap 
beef nations like Argentina, Australia, and 
Uruguay once peace-time trade relations had 
been reestablished.62 The sentiment was ech-
oed four months later by J. S. McLean, presi-
dent, Canadian Packers Limited, when he said 
that "with stabilization the British market will 
again discriminate against higher Canadian 
prices."63 In February 1946 J. P. Sackville, a 
prominent agriculturalist at the University of 
Alberta, warned that the British market in 
the long term was "a cause of concern."64 Crit-
ics were quick to point out that the present 
profitability of the British market was mis-
leading since the wartime purchases of Cana-
dian meat were supported partially by the 
Canadian taxpayer through Britain's exten-
sive Mutual Aid loans. With the termination 
of such loans, Britain would follow tradition 
and shut out Canada completely by buying in 
the cheapest market. 
In July 1946 the Meat Board Chairman 
McTaggart told the annual convention of the 
WSGA that he believed that Britain would 
take all of Canada's export cattle through to 
the end of 1948, and that the American mar-
ket was secondary to these more urgent post-
war needs. Then in October, Agricultural 
Minister Gardiner announced the signing of a 
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new beef contract to supply a minimum of 
120 million pounds of beef to Britain through 
each of the years 1947 and 1948. With this 
announcement, the stockmen realized the se-
riousness of their situation. Prices for the new 
British contract were in line with the Cana-
dian floor price for beef, and while reason-
able, were well below what they could expect 
in the United States.65 In December 1945, for 
example, Canadian prices were $6.50 per hun-
dredweight below their American counter-
parts. 66 
In the face of the rising costs of home pro-
duction the federal governments refusal to raise 
the ceilings on beef, the stockmen intensified 
their pressure throughout 1947 to have the 
American market re-opened. They were also 
fearful over the implications of the 1944 US-
Mexico cattle agreement, which removed the 
quota and reduced the duty on Mexican cattle 
exports to the United StatesY The National 
Council of Beef Producers succeeded in hav-
ing a recommendation for the embargo's re-
moval placed on the Canadian Federation of 
Agriculture's brief to the federal cabinet. The 
WSGA and the Northern Alberta Livestock 
Breeders also passed motions favoring the re-
sumption of trade with the United States.68 
As if in answer to the stockmen's prayers, the 
terms of the international Geneva Trade 
Agreement were announced in November 
1947. Under this agreement, which covered a 
wide variety of agricultural products, the 
United States agreed to increase the annual 
quota on live cattle imports from 225,000 to 
400,000 head and maintain the duty on cattle 
over 700 pounds at 1.5 cents per pound.69 
Described as "a great boon to prairie agricul-
ture," the Geneva Agreement heralded a ma-
jor victory for the cattlemen who entered 1948 
with every confidence that their lost market 
would again be opened to them when the agree-
ment took effect on 1 January 1948. 70 
They were wrong. On 15 January 1948, in 
one of the most amazing addresses ever given 
before the Western Stock Growers Associa-
tion, Agriculture Minister James Gardiner told 
convention delegates in Lethbridge that a re-
opening of the American export market was 
not in the nations's or the cattleman's best 
interests. 71 He cautioned cattle producers 
against tying themselves to the vagaries of US 
prices and becoming hostages to another 
country's production-cost cycles. He also em-
phasized the current US focus on cereal pro-
duction at the expense of livestock as 
indicating an American disinterest in Cana-
dian cattle. Gardiner also warned of the disas-
trous effects on Canadian price controls should 
the US market be open. His solution was to 
tie Canadian floor prices to a stable and per-
manent British market, one he referred to as 
"the freest and most satisfactory market in the 
world." After reiterating his intention of not 
breaking away from agricultural policy that 
had put Canada in "the soundest position in 
regards to agriculture that she has ever occu-
pied," Gardiner concluded his speech with 
imperialist rhetoric reminiscent of a bygone 
era. His Britain was "the mother of nations, a 
land which has led us all and which can still 
lead us all ... a nation which has led the world 
in the establishment of democratic institutions 
... freedom ... and sound finance based on 
sterling." 
All in all, it was an incredible and, some 
would say, courageous performance. Certainly, 
it was consistent with Gardiner's longstanding 
belief in the superiority of Great Britain as a 
long-range stable market for Canadian cattle. 
There also can be little doubt that his speech 
referred to more than cattle. Desperate for 
Canadian agricultural stability in the postwar 
era, Gardiner had clearly decided that the ster-
ling area offered the best opportunities for trade 
in wheat, hogs, other cereal crops, and cattle, 
in that order.72 And certainly he must have 
also been convinced that Britain would con-
tinue its policy of imperial preference even in 
the face of far cheaper Argentinean beef prod-
ucts. 
Following his delivery, Gardiner was sub-
jected to heated and angry questions from the 
floor. And while he parried them with ex-
tensive statistical data his words fell on deaf 
ears. The audience, that had, according to one 
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observer, "sat in grim silence" throughout 
Gardiner's speech, could not understand the 
minister's naivete. To them, the British mar-
ket would simply doom them to extinction. A 
unanimous resolution was passed the next day 
calling for the opening of the American mar-
ket. During the debate on the motion, George 
Ross, Chairman of the Canadian Council of 
Beef Producers, called for western Canada's 
secession from Canada should the American 
market be kept from them. 73 A Pincher Creek 
rancher summed up the sentiments with a more 
thoughtful reminder that cattlemen were not 
about to admit that government should run 
their affairs or that agriculture should be used 
to stabilize the country's whole economy."74 
Over the ensuing months the WSGA, sup-
ported by the National Council of Beef pro-
ducers, pressured the government to change 
its position, arguing that Argentina could sell 
dressed beef to Britain at a price lower than 
live cattle were bringing in western Canada, 
and that a reopened American market would 
add badly needed dollars to Canada's balance 
of payment deficit. Although Gardiner was 
quoted as late as May that he had no idea 
when the embargo was to be lifted, the end 
came with dramatic suddenness less than three 
months later. On 13 August, Gardiner an-
nounced that cattle exports to the United 
States would be resumed effective 16 August 
1948. 
The reasons for this sudden turnaround in 
policy were probably threefold. First, the mes-
sage about the economic tenuousness of the 
British market had at last begun to make an 
impact in official circles, especially in light of 
the intensive lobby conducted by the various 
national and regional stock associations in the 
spring and early summer of 1948. 71 It was 
known, for instance, that Finance, Minister 
Douglas Abbott had long been in favor of re-
moval of export restrictions to the United 
States. Second, with Canadian and American 
cattle prices beginning to converge, and the 
Canadian dollar now on par with the Ameri-
can, the fear of rampant inflation was less-
ened. 76 Yet probably the most pivotal factor 
was the failure of secret talks between the two 
governments on a free-trade deal. 77 Faced with 
a dollar deficit of $1.041 billion in 1947, Ca-
nadian officials had approached the Ameri-
cans in the fall seeking some sort of solution 
in the form of a loan and a comprehensive 
trade agreement, while hinting at long-range 
import restrictions without them. Realizing 
the importance of trade between the two coun-
tries and possibly wanting to disrupt the 
present system of imperial tariffs, the Ameri-
cans responded favorably. By mid-March the 
basis for a general agreement had been settled. 
The overall plan included, among other things, 
the immediate removal of all duties by both 
countries for five years and joint consultation 
on agricultural marketing. Opposition to the 
proposed agreement included Gardiner, of 
course, and Louis St. Laurent, Secretary of 
State for External Affairs and Prime Minister 
King's heir apparent. On 6 May 1948 a vacil-
lating Mackenzie King finally scuttled the 
whole deal ostensibly on the grounds that he 
could not conceive of a Liberal Party placing 
Canada at the mercy of powerful financial in-
fluences in the United States. In the light of 
this failure to achieve a sweeping trade agree-
ment, the resumption of live cattle exports 
was a recognition that Canada had not com-
pletely closed the door to the multilateral trade 
arrangements so favored by the United States. 
The cattlemen had at last achieved their 
goal. In the four and one-half month period 
following the reopening of the US market, 
300,000 head went south, realizing a total of 
$60 million in American dollars.78 The mood 
at the fifty-third annual convention of the 
Western Stock Growers Association in Janu-
ary 1949 was buoyant. In his report President 
Charles Mackinnon, referring to the lifting of 
the embargo, called 1948 one of the most im-
portant years in the history of the associa-
tion. 79 WSGA Secretary Ken Coppock 
probably best summed up the general opinion 
of western Canadian cattlemen when he told 
a radio audience in October 1949 that "the 
industry has now returned to logic and 
fact .... The future outlook has changed; the 
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fundamentals of the industry are now sound."80 
That their industry had not figured promi-
nently on Gardiner's wider stage of agricul-
tural trade policy, or that the government itself 
had failed to follow through on its perceived 
commitment to resume normal operations in 
peacetime, did not seem to matter in the new 
euphoria that accompanied the lifting of the 
embargo. To practical men in changing times, 
it was simply good to return to "business as 
usual." 
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